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Abstract
In this study, we use the announcement of the Volkswagen emissions scandal
on September 18, 2015, as an exogenous shock to measure consumers’ willing-
ness to pay (WTP) for brand reputation. Only Volkswagen diesel cars produced
in 2009-2015 were announced as emissions violators. Using eBay car auction data,
we estimate the impacts of the scandal on the prices of Volkswagen emissions non-
violating cars. Our difference-in-differences estimates show that final bid prices
decreased by 14% and 9% in diesel and gasoline car markets, respectively, which
purely reflected a decline in consumers’ WTP for Volkswagen’s brand reputation.
Additionally, the difference in price-drops between the violating and non-violating
diesel cars is statistically insignificant. This may be due to the fact that consumers
rationally adjust their WTP by expecting compensation which will almost surely
be provided by Volkswagen for violating models.
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1 Introduction
Brand reputation, which reflects consumers’ view of a firm and affects how much
they are willing to pay for its products, is a valuable intangible asset for the firm, espe-
cially when information asymmetry exists in markets. Briefly, a positive brand reputa-
tion helps the firm establish trust with consumers, which is likely to result in increas-
ing the firm’s sales and revenue. A negative brand reputation of the firm, on the other
hand, is likely to cause consumers to be hesitant about purchasing the firm’s goods and
services. In the last two decades, a large body of research in marketing literature has
offered discussion on brand reputation and its relevant management, see Keller and
Lehmann (2006).
Despite this important recognition, it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the
value of brand reputation – in particular, whether and how much a consumer is willing
to pay for a firm’s reputation – as reputation is not tangible like the quality or design
of a good (Ailawadi et al., 2003; Goldfarb et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2013). This study
serves as one of the few attempts to address consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for a
firm’s brand reputation by using data on eBay second-hand car auctions. eBay provides
a centralized marketplace for buyers and sellers to trade their items. The advantage
of using eBay auction data is that the auction mechanism is second-price (ascending
English), where it is a weakly dominant strategy for buyers to bid their true values.
Hence, transaction prices in the auctions give us a direct measure for consumers’ WTP.
In particular, this study examines whether and to what extent the Volkswagen diesel
emissions scandal in September 2015 influenced consumers’ WTP for Volkswagen cars
that are identified as emission standard non-violating models by the United States En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA), which purely reflects changes in valuation of
Volkswagen’s brand reputation. In 2009, a new emissions standard for diesel cars,
called Tier 2, was fully adopted in the U.S. car market, requiring that all car manufac-
turers meet the emissions limits. On September 18, 2015, the EPA publicly announced
that Volkswagen had installed emissions-compliance “defeat device” software in their
diesel models produced from 2009 to 2015 to help them pass the standard laboratory
tests. As there was no prior warning for the scandal, the EPA’s announcement was a
surprise to the U.S. car market. Exploiting this exogenous shock as a natural experi-
ment, our study focuses on estimating the impact of the scandal on consumers’ bidding
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behavior (and the final price) for non-violating Volkswagen cars at the individual trans-
action level and thereby sheds light on a causal relationship between consumers’ WTP
and the firm’s reputation.
Another important feature of this study is that we measure differentials in con-
sumers’ WTP for the brand reputation of Volkswagen in accordance with vehicle types
and model years. When a seller lists a car in an eBay auction, detailed information
about the car is provided, including the make, model year, and mileage. This allows
us to examine how consumers adjust their WTP for Volkswagen cars in different con-
ditions, that is, those equipped with and without emissions-compliance defeat device
software, and those with different fuel types (either diesel or gasoline) and different
model years. These differences will help us further understand how and to what ex-
tent consumers tailor WTP as their responses to the same market information across
differentiated products and different markets.
For analysis, we split cars into four broad categories: Diesel cars in model years
2000-2008 and model years 2009-2015, and gasoline cars in model years 2000-2008 and
model years 2009-2015. Following the EPA’s announcement, the Volkswagen diesel
cars in model years 2009-2015 were announced as the emissions violators. So we call
the diesel cars in model years 2009-2015 the violating category, and others the non-
violating categories. Our estimation analysis focus on the non-violating categories. We
use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach for each category of the non-violating
models, where the treatment group consists of Volkswagen cars and the control group
consists of other manufacturers’ cars.
Our DID results show that Volkswagen non-violators also experienced a significant
decline in final bid prices. Specifically, the final prices of Volkswagen diesel cars in
model years 2000-2008 dropped by around 14 percent on average, while a 9 percent
decrease was found for their gasoline cars in model years 2000-2008 and 2009-2015.
For these non-violating categories, Volkswagen diesel cars experienced a larger drop
in price than the equivalent gasoline cars, suggesting that diesel and gasoline models
are different markets and have different reputations. These changes in price purely
reflect a lowered WTP for the brand reputation of those cars, to the extent that the
quality of non-violating cars remains unaffected by the scandal. These results stress
the importance of taking consumers’ responses into account in the development and
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management of brand reputation for firms.
We further conduct several robustness checks to show that our empirical findings
are not driven by bidders’ entry and bidding times and sellers’ listing strategies be-
fore and after the emissions scandal. Finally, we discuss the violating category, that is,
the diesel cars in model years 2009-2015. As expected, the emissions scandal was also
found to have negatively influenced the final bid prices of Volkswagen violating diesel
cars. One would further expect a large drop in price for the violating category. How-
ever, surprisingly, the point estimate exhibits a 10.8 percent decline; this is smaller than
that for Volkswagen non-violating diesel cars, although the difference between the two
categories is not significant. This may be because consumers rationally adjusted their
WTP for the violating models in anticipation of compensation provided by Volkswagen
in the future.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a related literature
review. Sections 3 and 4 describe the background of the Volkswagen diesel scandal
event and the eBay car auction data. In Section 5, we conduct the main empirical anal-
ysis. Section 6 concludes the study.
2 Literature Review
In this section, we briefly review related studies on the measurement of brand repu-
tation as an intangible asset and how brand reputation would affect revenues of sellers
(firms). Thereafter, we provide discussion of the impacts of manufacturer recalls.
Brand reputation. After the seminal studies by Klein and Leﬄer (1981) and Shapiro
(1983), many theoretical studies have analyzed the relationship between a seller’s brand
reputation and transaction prices. The central finding is that a seller with a better rep-
utation obtains a price premium.1 However, in general, because of a lack of data, such
an analysis is a challenging task that speaks directly to the role of brand reputation in
supporting market transactions.
In recognition of brand reputations as intangible assets for firms, increased atten-
tion has been placed on understanding how to measure the valuation of the brand
1For further theoretical analyses, see the studies by Shapiro (1982), Allen (1984), and Tadelis (1999),
for example.
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reputation and what are the impacts on consumers’ WTP and seller revenues (Keller,
2001; Keller and Lehmann, 2006). Keller (1993) provides a conceptual model of how
to build, measure, and manage the valuation of brand equity from the perspective of
the individual consumer. Ailawadi et al. (2003) propose that the revenue premium a
brand generates (in contrast to that of a private label product) is a simple, objective, and
managerially useful product-market measure of brand equity. Goldfarb et al. (2009)
consider an approach which takes into account three sources of brand equity – brand
awareness, attribute perception biases, and non-attribute preference – and reveals how
much each of the three sources contributes to brand equity. Amir and Lev (1996) and
Barth et al. (1998) suggest using financial market performance to measure the valuation
of brand reputation.2
Some empirical studies have shed light on the importance of corporate brand rep-
utation in relation to price premium. For example, Landon and Smith (1997) provided
evidence that reputation has a significant impact on consumers’ WTP in that long-term
reputation is more important than short-term quality movements. Using California ve-
hicle emissions inspection data, Hubbard (2002) studied how reputational incentives
work, finding that sellers (firms) have an incentive to shade their reports of the buyer’s
condition to increase the short-run demand for their services. Jin and Leslie (2009)
examined the restaurant inspection program in Los Angeles and demonstrated that
reputational incentives are effective at encouraging restaurants to maintain good hy-
giene. McDevitt (2011) found evidence that poor performance leads a firm to conceal
its reputation.
At the same time, with the development of online markets in the last three decades,
a great deal of empirical research has addressed reputation and seller revenue using
data from online reputation systems. For example, Cabral and Hortac¸su (2010) exam-
ined the importance of eBay’s reputation mechanism using seller histories (measured
by feedback scores). Their results show that when a seller initially receives negative
feedback, his or her weekly sales rate drops from a positive 5 percent to a negative 8 per-
cent. Livingston (2005) found that sellers are strongly rewarded for the first few reports
that they have behaved honestly, but marginal returns from additional reports decrease
2The valuation of brand reputation is related to other aspects, like environmental impact, corporate
social responsibility; see studies, for example, by Bhattacharya and Sen (2003), Gu¨rhan-Canli and Batra
(2004), and Luo et al. (2013).
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severely. Using panel data from Taobao.com, a Chinese online shopping platform, Fan
et al. (2016) found that sellers enjoy substantial returns from positive reputations.3
Manufacturer recalls. This study links to previous studies about the impacts of car
manufacturer recalls.4 Using automobile manufacturer recall data, Barber and Dar-
rough (1996) and Rupp (2004) found significant and negative market reactions to auto-
mobile recall announcements followed by shareholder losses in stock markets. Ham-
mond (2013) tested consumer responsiveness to large-scale product recalls caused by
safety problems and found that a recall episode had negative effects in the automobile
resale market that were quantitatively small, statistically indistinguishable from zero,
and short lived.5
To the best of our knowledge, there are three studies on the Volkswagen emissions
scandal that are closely related to ours. Bachmann et al. (2017) focused on whether
collective reputation matters for firms. In particular, they found significant declines in
U.S. new car sales and stock returns of other German major car manufacturers, includ-
ing BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and Smart, as a result of the scandal. Ater and Yosef (2018)
found that the Volkswagen emissions scandal had a statistically significant negative
effect on the number of transactions involving used diesel vehicles made by Volkswa-
gen and on their final asking prices in Israel. Strittmatter and Lechner (2018) exploited
the decline in the observed quality of Volkswagen diesel cars after the disclosure of
the scandal in Germany, finding that the supply of used Volkswagen diesel vehicles
increased after the scandal was revealed and, further, that positive supply effects in-
creased with the probability of manipulation.
This study differs from prior studies in several aspects. First, we address con-
sumers’ WTP at the individual transaction level by examining data from a second-price
auction market. Our data cover transactions in a U.S. popular automobile market, al-
lowing us to measure consumers’ responses in the U.S., where the scandal initially
happened. Second, we examine individual brand reputation, that is, the reputation of
Volkswagen exclusively. We also consider collective reputation by estimating the scan-
3Other empirical studies include those by Melnik and Alm (2002), Brown and Morgan (2006), Cai
et al. (2014), Li and Xiao (2014), Jolivet et al. (2016), and Tadelis (2016).
4Some other studies have also examined the impacts of recalls of other products. See Freedman et al.
(2012) for recalls of toys and children’s products; Salin and Hooker (2001) for recalls of food.
5See further studies on the impacts of car manufacturer recalls by Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), Hoffer
et al. (1988), Rupp and Taylor (2002), and Rhee and Haunschild (2006).
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dal’s impacts on other major car manufacturers. Unlike Bachmann et al. (2017), who
found evidence that the scandal negatively affected the sales growth rate for German
car manufacturers, we will show that the scandal did not significantly affect buyers’
WTP for other major manufacturers’ cars. Third, our analyses across diesel and gaso-
line car markets and model year groups not only capture how consumers adjust their
WTP for the reputation of different cars from the same brand, but also shed light on
how consumers rationally respond to a recall event, almost surely anticipating com-
pensation by the firm afterward.
3 Background
Volkswagen diesel emissions scandal. Volkswagen Group is a German car man-
ufacturer and one of the largest automobile makers in the world, encompassing Eu-
ropean car brands that include Audi, Bentley, Bugatti, Lamborghini, Porsche, SEAT,
Skoda, Volkswagen, etc. In 2015, the group produced 10.41 million cars with total rev-
enue of 217.267 billion Euros and ranked second behind Toyota in terms of revenue.
Their market share in the U.S. is relatively small, about 3.4 percent, compared to other
major manufacturers, such as GM (17.3 percent), Ford (14.8 percent), Toyota (14 per-
cent), and Honda (9.3 percent).6
The United States EPA announced in 1999 that Tier 2 emissions standards would be
gradually implemented from 2004 to 2008 and fully in effect from 2009 on to enforce
tighter emissions limits.7 In 2007, Volkswagen suspended sales of their diesel cars in
the U.S. while developing technologies to meet the Tier 2 requirements. In the follow-
ing year, the group announced new clean diesel car models that satisfy Tier 2 as well
as European emissions standard Euro 5. Thereafter, Volkswagen diesel car sales in the
U.S. market rebounded, and the group won the Green Car of the Year Award for the
2009 Jetta TDI and 2010 Audi A3 TDI.
In 2013, researchers at the Center for Alternative Fuels Engines and Emissions (CAFEE)
at West Virginia University were appointed by the International Council on Clean Trans-
portation (ICCT) to conduct emissions testing for the purpose of investigating real-
6www.statista.com/statistics/249375/us-market-share-of-selected-automobile-manufacturers.
7Tier 2 emissions standards were phased out and replaced by Tier 3 emissions standards over the
period from 2017-2025.
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world operating emissions from European-based diesel cars sold in the United States.
Three tested diesel vehicles, a VW Passat, a VW Jetta, and a BMW X5, certified to the
Tier 2 standard in the laboratory tests, were found to have exceeded the standard in
real-world driving conditions: NOx emissions were exceeded by a factor of 15 to 35
for the Jetta and by a factor of 5 to 20 for the Passat, and BMW had emissions at levels
up to 10 times the standard in rural uphill driving conditions though the vehicle was
generally at or below the standard (CAFEE, 2014; ICCT, 2015).
The results were presented to the EPA, which conducted further testing to for-
mally investigate Volkswagen diesel car emissions. After a year-long investigation, the
EPA concluded that Volkswagen had installed on some of their diesel cars emissions-
compliance “defeat device” software, which is designed to activate only when the cars
are undergoing emissions testing. For this conduct, Volkswagen was issued a Notice
of Violation of the Clean Air Act on September 18, 2015. Affected vehicles were ap-
proximately 590, 000 model year 2009 to 2015 diesel cars which were sold in the U.S.,
mainly under the sub-brands of Volkswagen and Audi as well as some Porsche Cayenne
models.8 In the first business day after the announcement (September 21, 2015), the
stock price of Volkswagen Group declined by around 20 percent, and it declined by
another 17 percent on the following day. On April 21 and October 25, 2016, the group
announced a compensation and buyback plan for the owners of those cars, with the
owners to get from 5, 000 to 10, 000 dollars as individual compensation in the United
States. In January 2017, Volkswagen agreed to plead guilty to criminal charges and to
an Agreed Statement of Facts stating that because their diesel cars failed to pass federal
emissions tests, they developed the device and deliberately sought to conceal its use.
On April 21, 2017, the group was issued a 2.8-billion-dollar criminal fine by the U.S.
Justice Department for cheating on the emissions tests.
The Volkswagen diesel emissions scandal provides a great opportunity to explore
the research questions – whether and to what extent consumers are willing to pay for
a firm’s reputation – that we attempt to answer in this study. First, although the EPA’s
investigation took a whole year, the whole investigation procedure and results were
not announced publicly until September 18, 2015. Therefore, it is very unlikely that
individual buyers and sellers knew about the emissions scandal and adjusted their
behavior accordingly before the announcement day. This is also consistent with our
8https://www.epa.gov/vw/learn-about-volkswagen-violations.
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placebo tests in Section 5.2. Second, following the announcement by the EPA, only cer-
tain models of Volkswagen cars, i.e., diesel cars in model years 2009-2015, were identi-
fied as emissions violators. This clear-cut announcement gives an advantage when we
explore the impacts of the emissions scandal on Volkswagen non-violating models, as
it excludes other factors which may also potentially affect consumers’ WTP after the
scandal event, such as the possibilities of higher running costs and potential compen-
sation from Volkswagen. Thus, if any price drop exists in the non-violating models,
it should be purely driven by reduction in consumers’ WTP for Volkswagen’s reputa-
tion. Third, Volkswagen produces both diesel and gasoline cars across different model
years. This feature enables us to examine the differences of changes in consumers’
WTP for the same brand with differentiated productions when the emissions scandal
happened.
eBay car auction market. As one of the world’s largest online marketplaces, eBay
provides a centralized platform for sellers and buyers. The eBay car auction market,
also called eBay Motors, is a web-based marketplace launched in 2000 for dealers and
car owners to sell cars, mainly second-hand. The marketplace has experienced a rapid
development in the last two decades. Their total gross merchandise volume in 2009
was over 14 billion U.S. dollars, and the market is considered the biggest force in online
automobile sales in the United States.
The standard eBay auction format is a variant of a second-price auction with a spec-
ified ending time. The fixed ending time is pre-specified by sellers, with the option
of a certain number of days. eBay also provides other options that enable sellers to
customize their listings. An optional starting price, for example, plays the same role
as a public reserve. A secret reserve can also be set, and bidders are informed about
whether it has been met during the period of bidding competition. If the final auction
price is less than the secret reserve, the seller does not need to commit to the transac-
tion. Sellers can also choose delivery methods for the auction listing, mainly regarding
who should pay for the delivery fees. After the auction listing becomes active, bidders
submit their bids. When the auction ends, the bidder with the highest bid wins the
object, but only pays the maximum between the second highest bid and the starting
price. If the auction has a secret reserve price, the second highest bid should be greater
than the secret reserve price; otherwise, the seller does not need to commit to the sale.
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Further, the seller is required to provide some standardized information in the list-
ing, including the make of car, body type, mileage traveled, and production year as well
as whether the seller is a professional dealership. The seller may choose to add more
details in the item description by using text, photos, and graphs. eBay may charge fees
for posting additional information above a certain limit. For example, if a seller wants
to upload more than a certain number of photos, it costs $0.15 per each additional
photo.
eBay’s online auction markets are particularly suitable to estimate the impact of the
scandal on consumers’ WTP for Volkswagen’s brand reputation, because transaction
prices as well as the bidding records of all bidders are observable. In most existing
studies, the prices being compared are typically fixed prices rather than transaction
prices, which makes it difficult (and sometimes impossible) to identify the impacts of
an event on the variability of transaction prices. In addition, the eBay motor market
is sufficiently large and active; it includes almost all car brands and is one of the most
popular car sales platforms in the United States. Furthermore, each listing is required
to provide detailed information, which allows us to use extensive controls in our re-
gressions. For example, sellers’ eBay IDs and geographical locations can be observed.
Those advantages help us eliminate the possibility of the main findings arising from id-
iosyncratic characteristics of particular car brands, potential buyers, and sellers, which
may induce systematic differences among auction listings.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
Our data comprise information on successfully sold car auction listings on the U.S.
eBay Motors website between November 2014 and August 2016. Each listing contains
characteristics of the car (make, body type, age, mileage, and production year) and
characteristics of the auction listing (start price, listing duration, number of photos,
whether the auction has a secret reserve price, and who pays the shipping fees after
the transaction). Other listing information was also available for this study, including
the seller’s username on eBay, feedback score, and geographical location (state level),
the number of bidders, the number of bids, and the start/end time of the listing.
We make several sample restrictions before conducting our analysis. We first ex-
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clude observations with an unclear setting or missing data for the listing characteris-
tics, i.e., no information on make, mileage, and/or model year, and we only use listings
of either diesel or gasoline fueled cars. We also eliminate listings for cars produced be-
fore 2000, thereby focusing on cars with reasonable values and avoiding antique cars
intended for collections. In addition, we drop observations where the car is broken but
some parts are available for sale. Also eliminated are listings in which vehicles are not
comparable to Volkswagen’s products in the U.S. car market (e.g., heavy trucks).
Insert Table 1 about here
Summary statistics of the whole sample utilized for our analyses are presented in
Table 1. In total, we have 49, 497 successfully sold car auction listings. The average car
age and mileage are 10.8 years and 108, 829.7 miles, respectively, implying that the cars
in the sample tend to be well used. On average, a car is listed on the site with 12.6
photos for around 6.4 days, attracting 8.8 bidders in the bidding competition. About
96.6 percent of the auction listings require the winners to pay the shipping costs. The
average start price and final price are 2, 389.7 dollars and 9, 235.1 dollars, respectively.
Around 24.3 percent of listings set secret reserves; since the value of a secret reserve is
not observable, we set the secret reserve dummy equal to one if the auction listing has
a secret reserve; otherwise, zero. The average seller feedback score is 1, 119, indicating
that most sellers are well experienced and familiar with the rules in the marketplace.
Overall, compared to gasoline cars, diesel cars occupy a smaller proportion, around 7
percent; there are 3, 572 and 45, 925 listings for diesel and gasoline cars, respectively.
Table A1 in the Appendix presents summary statistics for Volkswagen and non-
Volkswagen cars with different fuel types (diesel and gasoline). On average, the start
and final prices for Volkswagen cars are lower than those of non-Volkswagen cars;
in the diesel (gasoline) car market, the average final prices for Volkswagen and non-
Volkswagen cars are 6, 728 and 15, 207 (4, 852 and 9, 068) dollars, respectively. For most
variables related to the characteristics of the auction listings, the means for Volkswa-
gen cars are similar to those of non-Volkswagen cars in both diesel and gasoline car
markets.
Insert Figure 1 about here
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The left (right) panel of Figure 1 presents monthly average transaction prices of
diesel (gasoline) cars separately for Volkswagen and non-Volkswagen. In each of the
used diesel and gasoline car markets, the average transaction price of Volkswagen cars
is found to be lower than that of non-Volkswagen cars throughout the sample period.
Importantly, the prices of Volkswagen and non-Volkswagen cars seem to move in a
relatively parallel manner; however, the gap in price becomes wider after the start of
the scandal (i.e., September 18, 2015), especially for the diesel car market.
In Table A2 of the Appendix, we report percentage shares of all car makes in the
sample. Consistent with market shares in the U.S. car market, major car manufactur-
ers take most of the transactions in the sample; Volkswagen takes 5 percent, BMW 6.8
percent, Ford 15 percent, Toyota 6.6 percent. Figure 2 in the Appendix presents the
monthly ratios of auction listings between Volkswagen and non-Volkswagen cars. Be-
fore the emissions scandal announcement, the ratio is around 5.5 percent. Although
the ratio decreases by around 1 percent after the announcement, it bounces back to
almost the same level as before after November 2015.
Overall, these data descriptions indicate that our following estimation results are
unlikely to be biased by heterogeneity in the auction characteristics and selection in
the car manufacturers. In Section 5.2, we show that our main findings still hold when
including different composition of car manufacturers in the control group and consid-
ering different optional choices that a seller can choose in the auction listing.
5 Empirical Analyses
5.1 Measuring WTP for brand reputation
To estimate the impacts of the Volkswagen emissions scandal in the determination
of WTP, we use the following difference-in-differences specification.
ln(Pit) = β0 + β1Scandalt + β2V olkswageni + β3Scandalt × V olkswageni
+ Controlsit + εit,
(1)
where i indexes a specific auction listing and t indexes the ending time of the auction.
The dependent variable, ln(Pit), is the natural logarithm of the final price for the auc-
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tion listing. Scandalt is a dummy variable that equals one if the ending time is after
the EPA’s announcement for Volkswagen violations, capturing aggregate factors that
would cause a change in the price even in the absence of the scandal. V olkswageni is
also a dummy variable that equals one if the car brand is Volkswagen, accounting for
possible differences between the treatment group (Volkswagen cars) and control group
(other manufacturers’ cars). The interaction term Scandalt×V olkswageni becomes one
for Volkswagen cars after the EPA’s announcement, and its coefficient β3 measures by
how much buyers’ WTP varied before and after the EPA’s announcement (i.e., when
the scandal was revealed).
In equation (1), Controls include observable variables of the characteristics of the
car and of the auction listing, specifically, the natural logarithm of car age, the natural
logarithm of mileage, the number of photos, the natural logarithm of the seller feedback
score, who pays shipping costs (a dummy variable that equals one if the winner pays
for shipping), the natural logarithm of start price, the secret reserve dummy, the listing
duration, the number of entering bidders, the year fixed effects, the month fixed effects,
and the body-type fixed effects. We also include the seller-identity fixed effects and the
car-make fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity in sellers as well as in
car manufacturers. For statistical inference, we use robust standard errors clustered at
the seller identity level.
We first examine diesel cars. As mentioned earlier, not all diesel cars made by Volk-
swagen are emissions violators; those in model years 2009-2015were announced by the
U.S. EPA as emissions violators, while those in model years 2000-2008 were not. This
raises the possibility that the scandal influenced the prices of Volkswagen diesel cars
in different manners, depending on whether or not they are emissions violators.
To account for this possibility, we split the sample into two sub-samples based on
model year; the first sub-sample consists of diesel cars in model years 2000-2008, while
the second consists of diesel cars in model years 2009-2015. This sample split allows
us to provide insights into how the emissions scandal influenced the final prices of
Volkswagen diesel cars. In particular, using the first sub-sample, where the treatment
group consists of Volkswagen non-violating diesel cars, we can avoid potential costs
associated with the uncertainty surrounding the usefulness of the violating models
and buyers’ expectations of compensation by Volkswagen, and precisely identify the
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effect of the scandal on WTP for Volkswagen’s brand reputation. If consumers were
fully aware of emissions violators due to the EPA’s announcement, a fall in the price of a
Volkswagen non-violating diesel car after the announcement reflects a decrease in WTP
for its brand reputation, to the extent that the quality of the car remained unchanged
by the scandal.
Insert Table 2 about here
The DID results for the first sub-sample are presented in Columns (1) to (3) of Table
2. As presented in Column (1), the coefficient of the interaction term is found to be
negative and significant at the ten percent level, indicating that WTP for Volkswagen
diesel cars was negatively affected by the emissions scandal. When we further include
the seller-identity fixed effect and the car-make fixed effect, the significance of the co-
efficient is not affected. In Column (3), the point estimate exhibits a decline in price by
about 14 percent, suggesting that the impact of the emissions scandal is economically
significant on consumers’ WTP for Volkswagen’s brand reputation.
We next examine gasoline cars in the sample. This analysis allows us to address
whether and how the scandal surrounding diesel cars affected Volkswagen’s brand
reputation in the gasoline car market. To provide further insights into impacts of the
scandal, we split the sample of gasoline cars into two sub-samples in the same manner
as before; the first (second) sub-sample consists of those in model years 2000-2008 (2009-
2015). By doing so, we can make a “vertical” comparison across model years to see
whether the diesel scandal had different impacts on WTP within Volkswagen gasoline
models, as well as making a “horizontal” comparison across Volkswagen diesel and
gasoline model years 2000-2008 (keeping model years fixed). Of note is that in the same
model period, the external and internal designs are very similar between Volkswagen
diesel and gasoline models, except for the engines.
As reported in Columns (4) and (6) of Table 2, our DID estimations show that the
prices of Volkswagen gasoline cars dropped by 9 percent for model years 2000-2008.
We then re-do the same estimation for the second sub-sample and present the results
in Columns (7) and (9), showing that Volkswagen gasoline cars from model years 2009-
2015 experienced a significant price drop by 9 percent after the diesel emissions scan-
dal. These findings suggest that potential buyers downgraded Volkswagen gasoline
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cars equally, irrespective of model year. The estimates reflect the extent to which the
level of Volkswagen’s reputation declined in the gasoline car market. The “horizon-
tal” comparison for model years 2000-2008 also suggests that Volkswagen’s reputation
was damaged to a greater extent in the diesel car market than in the gasoline car mar-
ket. This is in line with the idea that diesel and gasoline cars are in different markets
and thus have different reputations even for the same brand, while reputation in one
market affects that in another.
Overall, our results suggest that the scandal negatively influenced Volkswagen’s
reputation for both diesel and gasoline cars. This is possibly because consumers simply
do not like cars made by a manufacturer caught cheating on environmental standards
or because they have established the belief that Volkswagen cars generally perform
worse in terms of environmental pollution than other manufacturers’ cars.
5.2 Robustness checks
In this section, we perform several checks to examine the validity of our identifica-
tion strategy. Thereafter, we show the robustness of our main findings after considering
buyers’ and sellers’ behavior.
Placebo tests. Our identification strategy is based on the key assumption that there
was no prior warning of the emissions scandal. One might question the validity of
this assumption, because related research on emissions violations actually started in
2013, as mentioned in Section 3, raising the possibility that consumers anticipated and
responded to the scandal even before the EPA publicly announced the test results. To
check the credibility of the assumption, we conduct a placebo test by pretending that
the EPA’s announcement was made earlier than the actual date (i.e., September 18, 2015)
and then measuring the final bid prices after the artificial announcement but before
the announcement was actually made. If we obtain evidence for the scandal effect
with this artificial announcement, it would suggest that the scandal was anticipated by
consumers and had an effect even before it was revealed.
Insert Table 3 about here
For this purpose, we set the artificial announcement date to be July 18, 2015 and
then estimate equation (1) using only observations before September 18, 2015. The
14
result for diesel cars in model years 2000-2008 is presented in Column (1) of Table 3;
the DID estimate is found to be statistically insignificant at the ten percent level. We
further examine the gasoline models, and similar results - neither of the DID estima-
tors is statistically significant - are obtained for gasoline cars in model years 2000-2008
and 2009-2015, as presented in Columns (2) and (3), respectively. These results suggest
that the announcement of the emissions scandal on September 18, 2015 is as good as
random and generates exogenous variations in consumers’ WTP. One could argue that
the results are driven by the fact that we include other German car manufacturers and
other Volkswagen sub-brands in the control group. In Columns (4)-(6), we show that
these results are robust to the exclusion of cars made by other German car manufac-
turers from the sample and to the further exclusion of cars made by other sub-brands
of the Volkswagen group (Columns (7)-(9)).
We conduct another placebo test to further examine the relevance of our identifica-
tion strategy. Here, we estimate equation (1) by pretending that the treatment group
consists of cars made by a manufacturer other than Volkswagen; if our identification
strategy is sound, the scandal effect should not be detected for this artificial treatment
group. For this test, we first select General Motors Corporations (GMC) for an artificial
treatment group. As reported in Columns (1)-(3) of Table A3, the DID estimates are
not statistically significant at the ten percent level, regardless of the fuel type or model
year that we examine. The same tests repeated for Mercedes-Benz provide similar re-
sults (Columns (4)-(6)).9 Overall, our identification strategy seems to be sound in that
it does not falsely detect the scandal effect for manufacturers other than Volkswagen.
Since the pioneer work by Tirole (1996), collective reputation, which can be inter-
preted as a reputational externality affecting individual group members’ incentives
(payoffs), has been studied broadly.10 The results we obtained can also be interpreted
as indicating that buyers did not adjust their WTP for collective reputation in the car
market as a consequence of the emissions scandal. Our results are in contrast to those
obtained by Bachmann et al. (2017), who found significant declines in the U.S. sales
and stock returns of other German car manufacturers as a result of the scandal.
9We also estimate the same models for the auction listings with Toyota and Honda cars. The results
show that the final prices are not significantly associated with the interactions of the emissions scandal
dummy with brand dummies.
10See related empirical studies by Landon and Smith (1997) and Castriota and Delmastro (2015), for
example.
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The composition of the control group. Here we examine whether our main find-
ings are robust to the composition of the control group. We first address the concern
that other sub-brands of the Volkswagen group or other German car manufacturers
may not be relevant members of the control group, because they might have been in-
fluenced by the scandal due to some similarity to Volkswagen (i.e., belonging to the
same group or originating from the same country). For this purpose, we exclude from
the control group other sub-brands of the Volkswagen group11 and other German car
manufacturers. This exclusion does not affect our main findings, however, as presented
in Table 4.
Insert Table 4 about here
We also test whether our main findings are driven by including in the control group
manufacturers for which there are a small number of transactions, as one would argue
that the impacts of the emissions scandal on prices are amplified after including those
car manufacturers which take relatively small market shares and are not comparable
to Volkswagen in the U.S. car market. To do so, we re-estimate equation (1) by exclud-
ing those manufacturers with fewer than 100 transactions in the sample or by keeping
only those manufacturers that occupy no less than one percent of all transactions. The
results are virtually the same as those main findings in Table 2 (we present the estima-
tion results in Table A4 of the Appendix), further demonstrating the robustness of our
main findings.
Buyer behavior. It is possible that the scandal effects were not stable over time.
In particular, they might have been large for a short period of time and then become
smaller or even disappeared; if this is the case, our DID estimates of the scandal effects
may be misleading. To examine this possibility, we reestimate equation (1) by exclud-
ing from the sample all transactions made on September 18, 2015 (i.e., when the EPA
made the announcement). As reported in Columns (1)-(3) of Table 5, the results show
that our main findings are not significantly affected by this exclusion. Similar results
emerge even when we further exclude transactions made within a week before and af-
ter the EPA’s announcement (Columns (4)-(6)). These results suggest that the scandal
11For our analysis, sub-brands of the Volkswagen group only include Audi, Bentley, and Porsche,
because there are no observations in our sample for the other sub-brands such as SEAT, Skoda, and
Bugatti.
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provided a relatively long-term impact on buyers’ preference and WTP for Volkswa-
gen’s brand. This is in contrast with the relatively short-term impact on Volkswagen’s
stock price in the financial market, mentioned in Section 3.
Insert Table 5 about here
We have thus far interpreted our DID estimates as indicating changes in consumers’
WTP for Volkswagen’s brand reputation before and after the scandal was revealed. One
might be concerned about this interpretation, however, because changes in equilibrium
final prices can result from changes in bidders’ bidding behavior, such as more entries
by bidders and/or more bids submitted by each bidder. To address this issue, we set
the natural logarithm of the number of bidders for each listing to be the dependent
variable in equation (1) and thereby examine whether the number of bidders changed
before and after the scandal was revealed.
Insert Table 6 about here
As presented in Columns (1)-(3) of Table 6, the coefficients of the interaction term
are not significant even at the ten percent level; in other words, there is no strong evi-
dence that the scandal influenced bidders’ entries. We repeat the same exercise for the
natural logarithm of the number of bids for each listing (Columns (4)-(6)). According
to the results, the scandal does not seem to have significantly influenced the number of
bids; the coefficient of the interaction term is significant at the ten percent level only for
gasoline cars in model years 2000-2008, while it is not significant for all other categories.
These results rule out the possibility that buyers changed their bidding behavior after
the scandal was revealed, supporting that our DID estimates of the scandal effects re-
flect changes in buyers’ WTP for Volkswagen’s reputation.
Seller behavior. As presented above, after the announcement of the scandal, the
prices of Volkswagen emissions non-violating cars dropped significantly, suggesting
that the scandal damaged Volkswagen’s reputation. However, if the emissions scandal
affects an auction’s attributes chosen by the seller (e.g., number of photos and start
price), then the drops in consumers’ WTP that we have identified may be an artifact
of omitting the interaction terms of the scandal dummy with the auction’s attributes.
To address this possibility, we estimate equation (1) by adding an interaction term of
17
the scandal dummy with each optional choice in the auction, namely, start price, secret
reserve, number of photos, listing duration, and buyer shipping.
Insert Table 7 about here
Table 7 presents the estimation results, showing that our main empirical findings
still hold at least qualitatively; in all the regressions, the final price is still negatively
and significantly correlated with the interaction term of the scandal dummy with the
Volkswagen brand dummy. Overall, our main results appear to be robust to including
an additional interaction term of the emissions scandal dummy and an optimal choice,
suggesting that the price drop in consumers’ WTP for brand reputation is not driven
by seller behavior.
5.3 Volkswagen violating diesel models
In this subsection, we examine consumers’ response to the emissions violating group
- Volkswagen diesel cars in model years 2009-2015 - after the scandal announcement.
As presented in Columns (1)-(3) of Table 8, the coefficient of the interaction term is
found to be negative and significant at the one percent level, indicating that consumers’
WTP for Volkswagen emissions violating cars was negatively affected by the emissions
scandal.
Insert Table 8 about here
Somewhat surprising about the results are the point estimates. We would expect
a dramatic price drop for Volkswagen emissions violating cars. However, the point
estimate exhibits a decline in price by about 11 percent, while the magnitude of the
decline in price for diesel non-violating models is 14 percent (Column (3) in Table 2).
We further examine the difference between the two price drops; it is not statistically
significant, suggesting that the impact of the emissions scandal on the diesel violating
and non-violating cars is the same.
These results can be explained by the following reason. After the emissions scan-
dal, rational consumers would have lowered their WTP to reflect Volkswagen’s reputa-
tion damage and the potential costs and uncertainty surrounding the usefulness of the
18
emissions violating cars. But at the same time, buyers could have expected that Volk-
swagen would have a compensation plan after the scandal, including recall, buyback,
and/or cash payment, and that only violating model owners would be eligible for com-
pensation from Volkswagen. Therefore, although the compensation plan had not yet
been announced by Volkswagen at that time, potential buyers might have anticipated
it and rationally adjusted their WTP for violating models.
6 Concluding Remarks
On September 18, 2015, the Volkswagen emissions scandal began; the EPA accused
Volkswagen of installing software known as a “defeat device” to cheat on emissions
tests in the United States. Exploiting this exogenous shock and using individual trans-
action data from the eBay car auction market, we examined whether and to what extent
the scandal influenced the final prices of Volkswagen cars.
We found a statistically significant decrease in the final prices of diesel cars that
were not identified by the EPA as emissions violating models. This decrease reflects
how much buyers lowered their WTP for Volkswagen’s brand reputation, to the ex-
tent that the scandal did not change the quality of non-violating cars. Our empirical
findings evidently identify that brand reputation plays a non-negligible component in
determining consumers’ WTP (demand) for a product. In addition, there exist price-
drop differentials for Volkswagen non-violating cars; consumers’ WTP for diesel mod-
els decreased to a larger extent than for gasoline models. This suggests that consumers
respond differently to adjust their WTP even for the same brand.
We also examined the group of Volkswagen’s violating diesel models, showing that
it also experienced a significant decrease in final prices. However, interestingly, this
price drop is not significantly different from the drop in the group of Volkswagen’s non-
violating diesel models. This may be due to consumers’ expectation of compensation
from Volkswagen.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics - I
Obs. Mean S.D Min Max
Auction Characteristics
Start Price 49,497 2389.87 7049.68 0.01 439000
Final Price 49,497 9235.15 11094.35 1 599984
Seller Feedback 49,497 1119.02 3158.88 1 171320
Secret Reserve 49,497 0.24 0.43 0 1
Photos 49,497 12.56 8.46 0 24
Duration 49,497 6.44 1.67 3 10
Buyer Shipping 49,497 0.97 0.18 0 1
Number of Bidders 49,497 8.82 5.53 0 34
Car Characteristics
Diesel 49,497 0.07 0.26 0 1
Car Age 49,497 10.85 4.21 1 17
Mileage 49,497 108829.70 122331.90 1 9999999
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Table 4: Robustness Checks - Excluding Volkswagen Sub-brands and Other German
Car Manufacturers
Ln(Final Price) Diesel Gasoline Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Gasoline
00-08 00-08 09-15 00-08 00-08 09-15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Scandal -0.148** -0.095** -0.106** -0.154** -0.098** -0.096**
x Volkswagen (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Scandal 0.20 -0.009 0.004 0.163 -0.012 0.013
(0.13) (0.04) (0.03) (0.14) (0.04) (0.03)
Volkswagen -0.740*** -0.193*** -0.189*** -0.926*** -0.319*** -0.342***
(0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04)
R2 (within) 0.43 0.45 0.35 0.49 0.55 0.56
Obs. 2,841 31,706 12,056 2,704 28,345 11,029
Note: “00-08” denotes model years 2000 - 2008; “09-15” denotes model years 2009 -
2015. Columns (1) to (3) are the estimated results without Volkswagen sub-brands,
Columns (4) to (6) are the estimated results without other German car manufacturers.
Control variables are the natural log of car age, the natural log of mileage, the num-
ber of photos, the natural log of the seller feedback score, buyer shipping dummy,
the natural log of start price, secret reserve dummy, listing duration, number of en-
tering bidders. Year fixed effects, month fixed effects, body type fixed effects, seller
fixed effects, and make fixed effects are also included in all regressions above. The
robust standard errors are clustered at the seller identity level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Buyer Behavior - Excluding Transactions on the Scandal Day and One Week
Ln(Final Price) Diesel Gasoline Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Gasoline
00-08 00-08 09-15 00-08 00-08 09-15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Scandal x Volkswagen -0.141** -0.093** -0.092** -0.143** -0.103** -0.078**
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Scandal 0.230* -0.01 0.019 0.099 -0.063 0.054
(0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.20) (0.07) (0.07)
Volkswagen -0.960*** -0.324*** -0.337*** -0.950*** -0.314*** -0.341***
(0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04)
R2 (within) 0.48 0.56 0.56 0.48 0.56 0.56
Obs. 2,840 33,233 12,620 2,822 32,730 12,415
Note: “00-08” denotes model years 2000 - 2008; “09-15” denotes model years 2009 -
2015. Columns (1) to (3) are the results in which transactions on 18 September 2015
are excluded; Columns (4)-(6) are the results where we further exclude transactions
made within a week before and after the EPA’s announcement. Control variables are
the natural log of car age, the natural log of mileage, the number of photos, the natural
log of the seller feedback score, buyer shipping dummy, the natural log of start price,
secret reserve dummy, listing duration, number of entering bidders. Year fixed effects,
month fixed effects, body type fixed effects, seller fixed effects, and make fixed effects
are also included in all regressions above. The robust standard errors are clustered at
the seller identity level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent,
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 6: Buyer Behavior - Bidder Entry and Bidding Times
ln(Bidders) ln(Bids)
Diesel Gasoline Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Gasoline
00-08 00-08 09-15 00-08 00-08 09-15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Scandal x Volkswagen -0.043 0.05 0.097 -0.047 0.109* 0.144
(0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11)
Scandal 0.115 0.002 -0.052 0.239 -0.001 -0.015
(0.14) (0.04) (0.05) (0.21) (0.05) (0.08)
Volkswagen -0.106 -0.062 -0.319*** -0.035 -0.064 -0.385**
(0.09) (0.04) (0.11) (0.12) (0.05) (0.15)
R2 (within) 0.31 0.30 0.25 0.31 0.30 0.25
Obs. 2,842 33,283 12,642 2,842 33,283 12,642
Note: “00-08” denotes model years 2000 - 2008; “09-15” denotes model years 2009 -
2015. Control variables are the natural log of car age, the natural log of mileage, the
number of photos, the natural log of the seller feedback score, buyer shipping dummy,
the natural log of start price, secret reserve dummy, listing duration. Year fixed effects,
month fixed effects, body type fixed effects, seller fixed effects, and make fixed effects
are also included in all regressions above. The robust standard errors are clustered at
the seller identity level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent,
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 8: Volkswagen Violating Diesel Cars
Ln(Final Price) Diesel
09-15
(1) (2) (3)
Scandal x Volkswagen -0.127*** -0.127** -0.108**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Scandal 0.004 0.004 -0.018
(0.14) (0.06) (0.06)
Volkswagen -0.665*** -0.665*** -0.545***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Year FE Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y
Body Type FE Y Y Y
Seller FE N Y Y
Make FE N N Y
R2 (within) 0.72 0.74 0.76
Obs. 730 730 730
Note: “09-15” denotes model years 2009 - 2015. Control vari-
ables are the natural log of car age, the natural log of mileage,
the number of photos, the natural log of the seller feedback
score, buyer shipping dummy, the natural log of start price,
secret reserve dummy, listing duration. The robust standard
errors are clustered at the seller identity level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent
levels, respectively.
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Appendix (For Online Publication)
Table A1: Summary Statistics - II
Volkswagen Diesel Gasoline
Obs. Mean S.D Min Max Obs. Mean S.D Min Max
Auction
Characteristics
Start Price 692 1288.00 2858.74 0.01 31000 1,856 1316.61 2753.21 0.01 29000
Final Price 692 6728.99 5170.13 405 38888 1,856 4852.17 4208.61 1.25 33500
Seller Feedback 692 528.34 1500.84 1 13022 1,856 1621.79 5326.35 1 134377
Secret Reserve 692 0.19 0.40 0 1 1,856 0.20 0.40 0 1
Photos 692 9.27 8.62 0 24 1,856 11.13 7.95 0 24
Duration 692 6.82 1.56 3 10 1,856 6.18 1.77 3 10
Buyer Shipping 692 0.97 0.17 0 1 1,856 0.98 0.15 0 1
Number of Bidders 692 9.63 5.08 0 26 1,856 8.39 5.13 0 28
Car
Characteristics
Car Age 692 10.44 3.92 2 17 1,856 11.50 3.96 1 17
Mileage 692 139492.60 70436.99 1 380101 1,856 107665.30 61995.25 1 999999
Non-Volkswagen Diesel Gasoline
Obs. Mean S.D Min Max Obs. Mean S.D Min Max
Auction
Characteristics
Start Price 2,880 4154.75 7875.01 0.01 75000 44,069 2337.04 7144.70 0.01 439000
Final Price 2,880 15207.25 11440.99 1 208980 44,069 9068.81 11192.08 1.25 599984
Seller Feedback 2,880 501.77 1471.53 1 32599 44,069 1147.46 3129.66 1 171320
Secret Reserve 2,880 0.32 0.47 0 1 44,069 0.24 0.43 0 1
Photos 2,880 12.59 8.78 1 24 44,069 12.68 8.45 0 24
Duration 2,880 6.87 1.45 3 10 44,069 6.42 1.67 3 10
Buyer Shipping 2,880 0.96 0.18 0 1 44,069 0.97 0.18 0 1
Number of Bidders 2,880 8.60 5.31 0 32 44,069 8.84 5.57 0 34
Car
Characteristics
Car Age 2,880 11.36 3.48 1 17 44,069 10.79 4.26 1 17
Mileage 2,880 155011.90 203309 1 9999999 44,069 105379.10 117056.70 1 9999999
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Table A2: All Car Manufacturers in the Sample
Make Freq. Percent Cum.
Acura 596 1.2 1.2
Aston Martin 29 0.06 1.26
Audi 1,795 3.63 4.89
BMW 3,366 6.8 11.69
Bentley 44 0.09 11.78
Buick 653 1.32 13.1
Cadillac 2,125 4.29 17.39
Chevrolet 851 1.72 19.11
Chrysler 1,469 2.97 22.08
Dodge 1,655 3.34 25.42
Ferrari 29 0.06 25.48
Fiat 72 0.15 25.63
Ford 7,480 15.11 40.74
GMC 1,089 2.2 42.94
Honda 2,929 5.92 48.86
Hummer 209 0.42 49.28
Hyundai 872 1.76 51.04
Infiniti 704 1.42 52.46
Isuzu 98 0.2 52.66
Jaguar 633 1.28 53.94
Jeep 1,206 2.44 56.38
Kia 455 0.92 57.29
Lamborghini 21 0.04 57.34
Land Rover 629 1.27 58.61
Lexus 952 1.92 60.53
Lincoln 967 1.95 62.48
Lotus 21 0.04 62.53
Maserati 80 0.15 62.69
Mazda 966 1.95 64.64
Mercedes-Benz 2,945 5.95 70.59
Mercury 363 0.73 71.32
Mini 525 1.06 72.38
Mitsubishi 496 1 73.39
Nissan 2,434 4.92 78.3
Oldsmobile 77 0.15 78.46
Other 44 0.09 78.55
Plymouth 17 0.03 78.58
Pontiac 608 1.23 79.81
Porsche 346 0.7 80.51
Ram 107 0.22 80.73
Replica/Kit Makes 21 0.04 80.77
Saab 585 1.18 81.95
Saturn 385 0.78 82.73
Scion 173 0.35 83.08
Smart 120 0.24 83.32
Subaru 1,290 2.61 85.93
Suzuki 153 0.33 86.26
Toyota 3,268 6.6 92.86
Volkswagen 2,548 5.15 98.01
Volvo 987 1.99 100.00
Total 49,497 100
34
Figure 2: Monthly Ratios of Volkswagen and Non-Volkswagen Listings
35
Table A3: Robustness Checks - The Impacts of the Emissions Scandal on Other Major
Car Manufacturers
ln(Final Price) Diesel Gasoline Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Gasoline
00-08 00-08 09-15 00-08 00-08 09-15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GMC GMC GMC Mercedes Mercedes Mercedes
Scandal x Brand 0.083 0.026 0.095 -0.148 -0.046 -0.076
(0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.11) (0.03) (0.06)
Scandal 0.287** -0.018 0.01 0.281* -0.015 0.021
(0.13) (0.04) (0.03) (0.14) (0.04) (0.03)
Brand 0.218*** 0.104*** -0.01 0.301*** 0.365*** 0.574***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05)
R2 (within) 0.38 0.45 0.34 0.37 0.46 0.37
Obs. 2,842 33,283 12,642 2,842 33,283 12,642
Note: “00-08” denotes model years 2000 - 2008; “09-15” denotes model years 2009 - 2015. Con-
trol variables are the natural log of car age, the natural log of mileage, the number of photos,
the natural log of the seller feedback score, buyer shipping dummy, the natural log of start
price, secret reserve dummy, listing duration, number of entering bidders. Year fixed effects,
month fixed effects, body type fixed effects, seller fixed effects, and make fixed effects are also
included in all regressions above. The robust standard errors are clustered at the seller iden-
tity level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
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Table A4: Robustness Checks on Manufactures with Small Number of Transactions
ln(Final Price) Diesel Gasoline Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Gasoline
00-08 00-08 09-15 00-08 00-08 09-15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Scandal x Volkswagen -0.142** -0.091** -0.093** -0.141** -0.091** -0.093**
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Scandal 0.235* -0.014 0.015 0.231* -0.013 0.015
(0.12) (0.04) (0.03) (0.12) (0.04) (0.03)
Volkswagen -0.956*** -0.326*** -0.335*** -0.960*** -0.326*** -0.335***
(0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04)
R2 (within) 0.49 0.55 0.55 0.48 0.55 0.55
Obs. 2,823 33,128 12,591 2,842 33,178 12,609
Note: “00-08” denotes model years 2000 - 2008; “09-15” denotes model years 2009 - 2015.
Columns (1) - (3) are the results in which a car brand with less than 100 observations is ex-
cluded; columns (4) - (6) are the results in which a car brand with less than 1% market share is
excluded. Control variables are the natural log of car age, the natural log of mileage, the num-
ber of photos, the natural log of the seller feedback score, buyer shipping dummy, the natural
log of start price, secret reserve dummy, listing duration, number of entering bidders. The ro-
bust standard errors are clustered at the seller identity level. ∗∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance
at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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